1. Introduction

2. Legality: different shades of grey

Table: The practice of states: categories of the attribution of legality to a use of force

3. Usual legal categories for threats and responses

Self-defence in its strict sense

The controversy on the scope of self-defence in the Charter of the United Nations

What is the ‘self’ in self-defence?. Acts accepted by States Practice

Acts that constitute “aggression”

Direct and indirect aggression

Case: Malvinas (Falklands) (1982)

Case: Iraqi annexation of Kuwait (1990)

Precautionary self-defence

Avoiding ambiguity: the concepts of ‘preemptive’, ‘anticipatory’ and ‘preventive’ self-defence

The classical doctrine of precautionary self-defence

The case of the Caroline (1837) and the Webster ‘formula’

Interception, anticipation and sequence of events

Some historical examples

Case: Missiles in Cuba Crisis (1962)

Case: Six Days War (1967)

The doctrine of preventive intervention

Background

Prevention in a historical perspective

Case: Israeli attack to an Iraqi nuclear reactor (Osirak) (1981)

Case: Israeli destruction of a Syrian nuclear plant (2007)

Table: Threats and responses in the Doctrine of Preventive Intervention

4. Legality of threats and responses

The requisites of necessity, proportionality and immediacy

Necessity

Proportionality

Immediacy

Table: Legality of threats and responses

5. Diverse nature of usual threats

Who qualifies a fact or a situation as a threat?

Threats to sovereignty and human rights

Interventions to protect nationals abroad

Case: Israeli intervention in Entebbe (1976)

Case: U. S. hostages in Iran (1980)

Humanitarian Intervention. Responding to a threat to human rights

Case: NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999)

Threats coming from illicit networks, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism

Illicit international networks

Aquisition and possesion of weapons of mass destruction

Limits to deterrence, Chapter VII and armed intervention

Case: Lybia (1992; 2003)

Case: North Korea (2006)

Case: Iran (2006)

International terrorist networks

Interventions against hostile bases not consented by the State

Case: U. S. Intervention against Viet Cong bases in Cambodia (1970)

Case: Colombia intervention in Ecuador (2008)

Interventions against States that allow terrorist bases in their territories

Case: South Africa intervention in Lesotho (1982)

Case: Israeli intervention in Tunisia (1985)

Interventions against regimes that lead terrorist groups

Case: U. S. bombing against Lybia (1986)

Case: U. S. intervention in Afghanistan and Sudan (1998)

Table: The panoply of responses applied to usual threats

6. A panoply of responses is available

Non-armed responses

Exhaustion of negotiations and ultimatum

International cooperation

Soft intervention

Between soft intervention and deterrence

Case: “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act” (1996)

Case: “Iraq Liberation Act” (1998)

Case: “Iran Freedom and Support Act” (2005)

Additional armed responses

The two faces of Janus of deterrence and containment

Armed reprisals

Case: Israeli raid in Beirut (1968)

Case: U. S. missiles against Iraq (1993)

Interventions authorized by Chapter VII UNSC resolution (Authorized by Chapter VII)

Interventions to execute a UNSC resolution without its authorisation (Unilateral Chapter VII)

Armed intervention

Table: The panoply of responses to a threat

Table: The panoply of responses applied to usual threats

7. Political regimes play a role

The myth about the inviolability of the political regime in the U.N. Charter

Case: Italy (1943)

Case: Argentina (1944)

Case: Germany (1945)

Case: Japan 1945

Case: Spain (Franquism) (1946)

Case: China (Representation at the UN) (1949)

Case: China (The Taiwan question) (1950)

Case: Cuba (Castrism) (1962)

Case: Nicaragua (Somozism) (1979)

Case: South Rhodesia (racism) (1973)

Case: South Africa (racism) (1978)

Case: Afghanistan (Taliban regime) (1999)

Case: The Syrian regime (2004)

Threats coming from political regimes

Hostile regimes (“rogue states”)

Interventions against hostile regimes to impede them seizing power

Case: Hungary (1956)

Case: Checoslovakia (1968)

Case: Angola (1976)

Interventions against hostile regimes to foster a regime change

Case: Lebanon (1958)

Case: Dominican Republic (1965)

Case: Chile (1973)

Case: Cambodia (1978)

Case: Afghanistan (1979)

Case: Grenada (1983)

Interventions against hostile regimes to neutralize their activities

Case: Nicaragua (1982)

Case: Israeli intervention in Gaza (2008)

Interventions to change a regime that supports a terrorist group

Case: Afghanistán (2001)

Failed States (“weak and failing States”)

Interventions against hostile bases in failed states

Case: Viet Nam (1965)

Case: Israeli intervention in Lebanon. The “Litani Operation” (1978)

Case: Israeli intervention in Lebanon. The “Peace for Galilee Operation” (1982)

Case: Israeli intervention against Hezbollah bases in Lebanon (2006)

Interventions in failed states to foster a regime change

Case: Haiti (1994)

Authoritarian regimes

Interventions against authoritarian regimes to install democracy

Case: Irak (2003)

Interventions against authoritarian regimes to restore democracy

Case: Panama (1989)

Table: Usual threats from political regimes

Table: Responses to alleged threats from political regimes

Table: Interventions against political regimes in selected cases

Interventions against political regimes. Conclusions

8. Time is critical for both threats and responses

Table: Threats, response and time

Table: Response, threats and time

9. Threats not yet carried out are more complex to prove

10. States Practice. Provisional conclusions from selected cases

Table: Alleged and real threats and responses in selected cases

Table: Attribution of legality to a use of force in selected cases

11. Evolution of paradigms

Table: Evolution of the paradigm of the legality of armed responses by type of threat

Table: Evolution of the paradigm of the legality of armed responses to threats

Table: Evaluation of the legality of the response in selected cases

12. What can be expected in the next two decades?

Which are the cases of use of force between 2010 and 2015 that may show a change of paradigm?

Case: Illicit networks provoking the failure of the State

Case: Territorial claims in the South China Sea

Case: Chemical weapons in Syria

Case: Ukraine - Crimea

Case: IS and other religious armed groups controlling territory in Asia and Africa

Case: Iran nuclear program

13. What are the drivers for a change in the future legality of a use of force?

Unmanned technologies and other innovations in arms systems?

Multipolar international system?

Cultural and religious dividing lines?

Subsistance of authoritarian regimes?

Global economy without global values?

Global or regional civil societies?